Hoegh Osaka's actual cargo weight and stowage were significantly different to the final cargo tally supplied to the ship Hoegh Osaka's chief officer believed he knew with sufficient accuracy the quantity of ballast water in each tank. To comply with the Wallem SMS [safety management system] requirement for ballast tank soundings to be recorded daily, the chief officer falsified the sounding records Witness and anecdotal evidence suggests that the practice of not calculating the actual stability condition on completion of cargo operations but before the ship sails extends to the PCC/PCTC [pure car carrier/pure car and truck carrier] sector in general Land Rovers were estimated to be two tonnes each but actually weighed significantly more, which accounted for almost 350 extra tonnes. The report said: "Cargo distribution was such that the upper vehicle decks were full while the lower vehicle decks were lightly loaded. "The ship's inadequate stability had not been identified as no accurate stability calculation had been carried out before the ship sailed." It also said no stability estimation had been completed after all the cargo had been loaded, which had "become the norm" in the car carrier sector in general.
The actual report highlights the fact that some of the ballast tank gauges were non-operational (page 41) It also points out that the top-heaviness was only apparent at higher speeds The fist turn was negotiated at a lower speed so the ship did not go over then - but on the second turn at the higher speed. https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/56e9a7afe5274a14d9000000/MAIBInvReport6_2016.pdf
