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	<title>Comments on: OpenID Guerrillas: Day Five</title>
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	<pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 21:10:09 +0000</pubDate>
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		<item>
		<title>By: Tamlyn</title>
		<link>http://community.plus.net/blog/2008/03/07/openid-guerrillas-day-five/#comment-1956</link>
		<dc:creator>Tamlyn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Mar 2008 17:57:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://community.plus.net/blog/2008/03/07/openid-guerrillas-day-five/#comment-1956</guid>
		<description>Seems fairly simple. In effect the attacker is indistinguishable from a genuine user so there's no way of preventing it from loading all the relevant content (text, images, stylesheets, scripts) from the identity provider. From that point it's just a case of spitting it out again to the victim of the attack. It's a tricky one.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Seems fairly simple. In effect the attacker is indistinguishable from a genuine user so there's no way of preventing it from loading all the relevant content (text, images, stylesheets, scripts) from the identity provider. From that point it's just a case of spitting it out again to the victim of the attack. It's a tricky one.</p>
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		<title>By: Kelly</title>
		<link>http://community.plus.net/blog/2008/03/07/openid-guerrillas-day-five/#comment-1923</link>
		<dc:creator>Kelly</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Mar 2008 18:19:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://community.plus.net/blog/2008/03/07/openid-guerrillas-day-five/#comment-1923</guid>
		<description>Does that add enough faff to the phish attempt to discourage it? Or is it dead simple (tm)?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Does that add enough faff to the phish attempt to discourage it? Or is it dead simple (tm)?</p>
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		<title>By: Tamlyn</title>
		<link>http://community.plus.net/blog/2008/03/07/openid-guerrillas-day-five/#comment-1920</link>
		<dc:creator>Tamlyn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Mar 2008 16:30:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://community.plus.net/blog/2008/03/07/openid-guerrillas-day-five/#comment-1920</guid>
		<description>Referrer checking on images is easily overcome by changing the image source to point to a proxy on the phishing server which loads the correct images from the identity provider by sending a fake referer header.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Referrer checking on images is easily overcome by changing the image source to point to a proxy on the phishing server which loads the correct images from the identity provider by sending a fake referer header.</p>
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